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MARTIN P. CATHERWOOD LIBRARV 
STATEMENT OF DAVID M. SILBERMAN, DIRECTOR, NEW YORK STATE SCHOOL 
AFL-CIO TASK FORCE ON LABOR LAW INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS 
Cornell University 
BEFORE THE 
COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 
August 10, 1994 
I thank the Commission for this opportunity to present the 
views of the AFL-CIO on the questions before you today. 
The present challenge facing the Commission is to recommend 
steps for the federal government to take to encourage what the 
notice for this hearing terms "employee participation in the 
workplace." Our discussion of this issue proceeds in three parts. 
In Part I we argue that the highest priority of the government 
should be to encourage democratic forms of employee participation 
rather than those which are employer-controlled. Part II presents 
the. AFL-CIO's suggestions for encouraging this type of employee 
participation. Finally, in Part III, we address what we quite 
frankly see as a "red herring," namely the issue of whether Section 
8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act and the Electromation 
case, is inhibiting any other forms of employee participation that 
ought to be encouraged. 
I 
"Employee participation," as the Commission's Fact Finding 
Report states (at p.29), can "take a wide variety of forms" and the 
phrase can mean a variety of things. It can refer to nothing more 
than a garden-variety suggestion box through which employees 
"participate" by submitting their ideas for management to accept, 
reject, or ignore. At the opposite end of the spectrum, "employee 
participation" can refer to a system of co-determination in which 
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employees and managers participate as equals in jointly making 
decisions on some or all workplace issues. 
Given the range of practices encompassed within the phrase 
"employee participation," before this Commission can formulate 
recommendations in this area the Commission must first determine 
which forms of employee participation merit, and need, the 
affirmative encouragement of the government and which should be 
left to their own devices within the current legal system. 
No one, for example, would seriously suggest that the 
government ought to act to encourage employee suggestion boxes: 
there is no evidence that such suggestion boxes significantly 
advance any public interest so as to warrant the solicitude of the 
government, nor is there any reason to believe that government 
action is needed to catalyze the diffusion of suggestion boxes. It 
is very much to the point, that, at the other end of the spectrum 
the federal government long ago made the judgment in favor of 
"encourag[ing] the practice and procedure of collective bargaining" 
— to quote from the first section of the Wagner Act — as a means 
through which employees can participate in determining the terms 
and conditions of their employment. 
1. In deciding what forms of employee participation should be 
encouraged, we believe it essential to distinguish between the two 
qualitatively different approaches that have been posed to this 
Commission. 
(a) The first approach is, perhaps, best labeled 
"participative management" — a term that no longer is politically 
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correct in management circles but which nonetheless revealingly 
captures the essence of these forms of participation. 
Participative management is, as Richard Beaumont, the President of 
Organization Resources Counselors succinctly put it in his 
testimony to this Commission, "a way of getting work done."1 This 
form of participation is "task driven," as Jerry Jasinowski, 
President of the National Association of Manufacturers testified; 
workers are "empower[ed] to solve problems and to do tasks."2 
The witnesses who have come before this Commission to extol 
the virtues of participative management — or what they prefer to 
call employee involvement — have stressed the ways in which it 
departs from Taylorism in the responsibility that is delegated to 
the individual employee and the work team. But in the most 
fundamental respects, participative management reaffirms the 
traditional hierarchical relationship between management and 
workers since, as the Commission stated in its Report (at 52), 
management "retains control over whether to initiate, change or 
abandon employee participation." 
On this approach it is management that creates the 
participatory structures — the teams, committees, cells and the 
like. It is management that defines their jurisdiction and their 
mission — i.e., that determines what "problems" or "tasks" to 
authorize the group to address. It is management that selects the 
employees to participate in these efforts (or, at a minimum, 
1Transcript of Commission Hearing of January 19, 1994 at 170. 
2Tr. at 113 (Nov. 8, 1993) (emphasis added). 
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determines the rules for such selection) . And it is management 
that establishes the scope of their authority — that determines, 
for example, which bodies make recommendations and which make 
decisions. For all these reasons, participatory management might 
better be termed management-controlled participation. 
Motorola is often thought of as the epitome of this type of 
system; indeed, in a written submission to the Commission, Motorola 
boasts of its "over 4,400 problem solving teams that have 
revolutionized the way we do business."3 Motorola's New Employee 
Handbook, excerpts of which are attached hereto, likewise talks 
about Motorola's commitment to "empowerment for all, in a 
participative, cooperative and creative workplace" as Motorola's 
"chosen method of managing." But Motorola's statement of the 
"Operating Principals [sic] for working in the empowerment process" 
makes clear the limits of management-controlled participation: 
1. Empowered teams exist to achieve Motorola's key 
initiatives. The purpose of empowered teams is to 
achieve our key initiatives of Six Sigma guality, total 
cycle time reduction, production and manufacturing 
leadership and profit improvement. Activities undertaken 
by empowered teams should be to further one or more of 
these initiatives. 
*** 
5. Decision-making regarding employment issues remains with 
management. Management will continue its role in making 
decisions regarding terms and conditions of employment 
for individual team members, such as pay, hours of work, 
benefits etc. Team members are encouraged to 
individually discus concerns about their employment with 
management. 
3Letter from James D. Burge, Corp. Vice President to Thomas 
Kochan, February 22, 1994, Docket No. 181. 
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Nor is Motorola unique in the limitations it places on 
participation and empowerment. Bruce Carswell, the Chairman of the 
Board of Directors of the Labor Policy Association, made this quite 
clear in his testimony, analogizing employee involvement to the 
"power in the pro football sense of bringing a play back in the 
huddle and have it thought of as being used, but the quarterback 
eventually has to make some decisions."4 
(b) In contrast to the various forms of management-created and 
management-controlled participation is the second approach to 
employee participation which has been described to the Commission: 
what we call, for want of better terms, "joint labor-management 
decision-making systems" or "democratic participation." Whereas 
management-controlled participation begins from the premise of 
unilateral, management decision-making except to the extent that 
management delegates authority to bodies created by management, 
democratic participation starts from the premise of joint decision-
making by management and workers, through representatives of their 
own choosing. In this country collective bargaining between the 
management of an individual establishment and a union representing 
the employees at that establishment generally provides the vehicle 
through which such participation takes place; in Europe collective 
bargaining takes place at the industry level and is supplemented at 
the establishment level by elected works councils. 
On this approach, participatory structures may be jointly — 
rather than unilaterally — created through collective bargaining, 
^r. at 164 (Nov. 8, 1993). 
6 
and their composition, jurisdiction, and authority jointly — 
rather than unilaterally — agreed to. In this way, employee 
participation may be extended down to the level of work processes 
on the shop floor and up to the level of strategic decisions in the 
corporate suites. 
Democratic participation is thus more than merely a way of 
getting the work done, and it aims at more than "involvement" or 
task-driven empowerment. Rather, as explained in The New American 
Workplace: A Labor Perspective, a report by the AFL-CIO Committee 
on the Evolution of Work which was unanimously approved by the 
AFL-CIO Executive Council: 
The aim of this approach is to achieve work organizations 
which at one and the same time are more productive and more 
democratic. Therein lies the source of its legitimacy and its 
power. [Emphasis in the original] 
2. On any measure, it is the democratic form of employee 
participation which should command the government's attention and 
which is worthy of governmental impetus. 
(a) Viewed first strictly from the standpoint of enterprise 
efficiency — that is, based on the contribution that participation 
can make to improving productivity and guality and thus to 
enhancing firm performance — there is strong reason to favor 
bilateral systems of participation over those that are management-
controlled. To begin with, as the Commission Report notes (at 36) , 
several studies have found "a higher survival rate" for 
participatory programs "in union than nonunion establishments"; 
that finding is especially significant given what the Commission 
terms (at 48) the "long history of temporary fads" in this area and 
the difficulty of "sustain[ing]" labor-management cooperation "in 
the American environment." 
Moreover, insofar as the economic advantage to be derived from 
employee participation lies in the level of commitment and 
discretionary effort that is elicited from the workforce, there is 
strong reason to believe that, over the long term, participatory 
systems rooted in workplace representation will outperform those 
that are not. Employees whose terms and conditions of employment 
are the product of an agreement between management and the 
employees' own representative have an institutional assurance that 
they will share fairly in ~ and will not suffer adverse 
consequences from — productivity gains produced through their 
efforts and they have mechanisms available to them to voice their 
grievances if they do not. Employees who are unrepresented must 
either place their faith in management's beneficence or, more 
likely, the employees must safeguard their interests against 
management opportunism. 
Numerous studies have proven that, as Professors Freeman and 
Medoff put it, unionism "changes the employment relationship from 
a casual dating game, in which people look elsewhere at the first 
serious problem, to a more permanent 'marriage' in which they seek 
to resolve disputes through discussion and negotiation."5 This 
phenomenon, Professor Freeman has more recently written, "applies 
• 
5R. Freeman & J. Medoff, What Do Unions Do at 94 (1984) . 
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universally to unionism in industrialized countries."6 Absent 
compelling evidence to the contrary — and there is none — it 
stands to reason that the same experience will be replicated in 
participatory systems and that, over time, represented employees 
will commit themselves more fully to their work. 
That is the precise point that Jerome Rosow, President on the 
non-partisan Work in America Institute, made in his testimony to 
this Commission: 
[W]orkers in unionized situations are more supportive of the 
system because they have the union to keep it honest and 
because they are more willing to learn and change as compared 
with those that do not have a contract. This has to do with 
their seniority or security, their pension, grievance, 
procedure, and so forth. So that that relationship, employees 
having a voice and having a protector in the form of a union, 
encourages the change process.7 
And since the publication of the Commission's Report, a new study 
has been published which finds that "unionized firms, on average, 
provide a much better environment for tapping the benefits of 
employee participation programs than do nonunion firms."8 
Even the analysis commissioned by the Employment Policy 
Foundation and prepared by the Center for Effective Organizations 
acknowledges that "a union which is favorable to employee 
involvement and works effectively to produce the conditions which 
6Freeman, "Is Declining Unionization of the U.S. Good, Bad, or 
Irrelevant," in L. Mishel & P. Voos (eds), Unions and Economic 
Competitiveness at 149 (1992). 
7Tr. at 192 (Sept. 15, 1993). 
8Cooke, "Employee Participation Programs, Group-Based 
Incentives, and Company Performance: A Union-Nonunion Comparison, 
47 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 594 (July, 1994). 
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support employee involvement can indeed contribute to a successful 
employee involvement effort" and that the "key determinants of 
success are conditions which unions may help to create."9 On that 
basis alone, the case for focusing government efforts on 
encouraging democratic forms of participation would seem to be 
compelling. 
(b) In our view, however, it would be mistake of the first 
order — and a grave disservice to the kind of public debate that 
is needed in this country — were the Commission to ground its 
recommendations solely in efficiency considerations. Public policy 
is not made, and can not be, on one dimension. Enhancing 
enterprise efficiency is, no doubt, an important end of public 
policy but it is not the onjy end. The Commission should make that 
clear and should explicitly base its recommendations on the full 
range of social values. 
(i) Chapter One of the Commission's Report provides a useful 
starting point. The Commission there recognizes that this society 
seeks, and in the past has achieved, "economic progress for 
virtually all our citizens" (p.26). But the "changes in the 
economy, technology, workforce and competitive conditions ... have 
interacted within the U.S. labor relations systems to produce 
employment and wage outcomes that differ greatly from those in the 
past and fall short of meeting the needs of many Americans" (p. 14) . 
As the Commission warns (at 26), "a healthy society cannot long 
9G. McMahan & E. Lawler, Effects on Union Status on Employee 
Involvement: Diffusion and Effectiveness (Employment Policy 
Foundation Policy Paper, February, 1994). 
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continue along the path the U.S. is moving, with rising bifurcation 
of the labor market." 
Democratic forms of employee participation provide a means of 
addressing these distributive issues; management-controlled 
participation does not. Where workers enjoy the benefit of 
workplace representation, they can and do jointly decide with 
management the share of the firm's earnings that are paid to 
workers; that is, of course, the heart of what collective 
bargaining is all about. As the Commission observes (at 18), 
unions "bring the earnings of production workers closer to that of 
supervisory workers" and thereby "reduce earnings differentials 
within establishments." Thus — as Congress recognized almost 
sixty years ago — government ought to encourage employee 
participation through unions as a means of achieving more equitable 
economic outcomes. 
The union role in protecting labor standards from continued 
erosion is now more important than ever. The Commission's Report 
recognizes (at 22) that employers increasingly have found it 
convenient to "reduce labor costs by retaining a smaller core of 
year round full-time workers who receive full benefits" and filling 
in with part-time workers who are "lower paid per hour than full-
time workers" (p. 21), and with temporary workers who "tend to be 
in relatively low wage occupations" (id.).10 
10A recent study of part-time workers — who comprise the vast 
bulk of the contingent workforce — finds that 81% of part-timers 
(compared to 22% of full-time workers) have earnings below $10,000; 
13.8% of part-time workers and 25.8% of involuntary part-time 
workers (compared to 5.2% of full-time workers) have family incomes 
11 
Left to their own devices, employers can be expected to 
continue down this path and allocate work between contingent and 
core employees based solely on an economic calculus as to the 
trade-off between reducing labor costs and reduced employee 
commitment; this trend as it unfolds is leading to less and less 
full-time employment for lower-skilled workers. Unions inject 
human values into that calculus, seeking to maximize the number of 
"core employees" receiving full benefits and at the same time to 
improve the situation of thos workers outside of the core. 
(ii) Chapter IV of the Commission's Report identifies another 
important end of public policy in this area. The question 
addressed in that Chapter is, as formulated by the Secretaries of 
Labor and Commerce in their charge to the Commission: 
What (if anything) should be done to increase the extent to 
which work-place problems are directly resolved by the parties 
themselves rather than through recourse to state and federal 
courts and government regulatory bodies? 
Implicit in that formulation is the entirely sensible judgment 
that, all other things being equal, private resolution of work-
place problems is to be preferred over governmental solutions both 
because private resolutions are less costly to procure and better 
tailored to the needs of the individual workplace. 
This end, too, is most likely to be realized through bilateral 
systems of employee participation. The scope of the issues that 
below the poverty level; only 16.4% of part-time workers (compared 
to 61% of full-time workers) receive health insurance through their 
employment; and only 11.4% of part-time workers (compared to 48% of 
full-time workers) participate in a pension or retirement plan. 
Employee Benefit Research Institute, Characteristics of the Part-
Time Work Force at 45, 48, 53, 64 (May, 1994). 
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can be addressed through these systems is defined neither by 
management alone nor by the employees alone, but by the two parties 
together. Thus the collective bargaining process enables 
employees, as a matter of right, to raise and jointly resolve all 
issues of concern to them involving terms and conditions of 
employment. Indeed, it is no coincidence that what the Commission 
terms (at 125) "an explosion in the breadth and depth of legal 
regulation of the American workplace" has occurred at the same time 
that, in the Commission's words (at 127), "the private institutions 
Americans have traditionally relied upon to resolve issues without 
resort to government regulation and court legislation, namely 
collective bargaining [and] grievance arbitration declined in 
coverage." 
In addition, to the extent that federal (or state) law elect 
to remove certain matters from private decision-making and extend 
rights to employees whatever their market power, workers are far 
more likely to be able to enjoy those rights in practice if the 
workers are collectively represented. In the end, the enforcement 
of public-law norms which grant rights to individuals necessarily 
turns on individual enforcement actions. And, as the Commission 
observes (at 113), "[a]ccess to legal relief through the courts is 
limited for the majority of employees whose earnings are too low to 
cope with the high costs and contingency fee requirements of 
private lawyers." But as the Commission also notes (at 126), aside 
from the wealthy, those "best able to take advantage of the law are 
... employees who have the kind of representation (usually a union 
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or some other advocacy group) that gets the attention of a short-
staffed administrative agency." 
(iii) Instrumental considerations aside, there are certain 
issues of principle that are implicated here as well. The right of 
all citizens to choose their own, freely-elected representatives is 
the bedrock of the American political system. Given the conditions 
of modern life, working men and women are as deeply and immediately 
affected, in many respects, by decisions made by their employers as 
by decisions made by their government. If the United States is to 
realize its highest ideals, public policy should seek to extend our 
commitment to democratic processes from the political sphere to the 
economic sphere by encouraging democratic forms of employee 
participation. 
Indeed, as President Kirkland testified before this 
Commission: 
Workplace democracy is not simply a good for working 
people; it is integral to the national interest in a healthy 
political democracy. Workers who participate in decision-
making in the economic sphere can be counted on to participate 
actively in the political sphere as well; workers who are 
denied responsibility for their workplace conditions cannot. 
It is thus not surprising that vital labor movements nourish 
political democracy, as the recent experience in Central and 
Eastern Europe, Chile and South Africa all attest. And where 
workplace democracy is extinguished — where workers are left 
unrepresented — political democracy is in jeopardy as well. 
(c) The short of the matter, then, is this. Bilateral, 
democratic forms of employee participation are at least as likely 
as — and, over the long term, indeed more likely than — 
management-controlled forms of participation to enhance the 
performance of American businesses and to that extent contribute to 
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our national economic health. These democratic forms of 
participation are far more likely than other forms of employee 
participation to contribute to the economic and social well-being 
of working men and women. And these democratic forms of employee 
participation are essential bulwarks to our democratic system of 
government. For all these reasons, the public policy priority 
should be to support and advance democratic forms of employee 
participation. 
II. 
The question thus becomes: what should the federal government 
do to encourage the development of democratic forms of employee 
participation. 
In our view, the single most important change that could be 
made in this regard would be to reform the labor laws so as to make 
union representation accessible for the workers who desire it. 
That will, of course, be the subject of the Commission's September 
8th hearing, and we look forward to the opportunity to present our 
specific recommendations at that time. 
An effective labor law at a minimum would provide employees 
with a means of participating in workplace decisions whenever there 
is majority support among an "appropriate" employee group for doing 
so. But there are many workplaces in which the workers who desire 
to participate constitute less than a majority of the grouping 
deemed appropriate by the government. Under current law the desire 
of these workers to participate in decisions affecting their 
working lives is frustrated by a legal system which recognizes only 
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one type of employee representation. 
In our view, the time has come to move beyond the all-or-
nothing approach to representation embodied in our current law. 
More specifically, we believe that where there is significant 
support for representation within a workplace, the law should grant 
the workers desiring representation the right to designate their 
representative and should impose upon the employer an obligation to 
meet and confer with the representative to discuss all issues of 
concern (or at least all issues that must be negotiated with an 
exclusive representative). 
The aim of this alternative form of representation, it should 
be emphasized, would not be to negotiate a formal agreement and no 
formal duty to bargain would attach; we do not believe it is 
practicable to mandate bargaining with multiple entities each 
representing a slice of the workforce. But it is possible — and 
it would be the aim of this system — to provide employees desiring 
representation with a voice in the various enterprise decision 
through representatives of their own choosing. 
Executive Order 10988, which was signed by President Kennedy 
in 1962 to establish the first formal system of representation for 
federal employees, provides a possible model for such a 
regime. That Order provided for three levels of recognition and 
representation — denominated as informal, formal, and exclusive — 
based upon the degree of support for representation withiri the 
workplace. 
Informal recognition simply entitled an organization to 
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present its views on matters of concern to its members; this 
recognition was extended to organizations which did not qualify for 
formal or exclusive recognition. Formal recognition was extended 
to organizations which were supported by at least 10% of the 
employees in an appropriate unit; it carried the right to meet and 
confer with the employer on issues of concern to the employees. 
Exclusive recognition was afforded only to majority 
representatives, and carried with it, of course, the right to 
bargain collectively on behalf of the entire group on defined 
subjects of bargaining. 
The details of such a system for private sector employees 
would have to be developed with care to assure that the system does 
not paralyze employer decision-making by requiring continuous 
consultations with a large number of employee organizations each 
representing a small piece of the workforce. Care likewise must be 
taken to assure that such a system does not frustrate the 
employees' eventual ability to secure the right to bargain 
collectively on behalf of all members of an appropriate bargaining 
unit. In that regard, the system would have to assure effective 
protection for workers who choose to participate both to guard 
against retaliation and to enable those workers who serve in 
leadership positions to discharge their responsibilities to their 
constituents. 
We would be pleased to supply the Commission with more 
detailed thoughts as to how a system of members-only representation 
could be structured so as to maximize the benefits for employers 
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and employees alike. For present purposes it suffices to note that 
permitting employees who wish to participate in the decisions that 
affect their working lives to initiate a system of consultation and 
representation even in the absence of majority support for 
collective bargaining would make an important contribution to 
promoting the kind of democratic participation that should be 
encouraged in this country. 
Beyond that — beyond creating the structural guarantees that 
are needed for democratic employee participation — we believe 
there are steps the federal government can and should take to use 
its "bully pulpit" to promote the kind of employee participation 
that is good for businesses and workers alike. In this regard, we 
see much merit in Representative Gephardt's recent proposal for an 
American version of the Australian Best Practice programs, 
described in the Commission's Report (at 42). 
There are many organized workplaces in this country in which 
employee participation begins and ends at the collective bargaining 
table. Too often that reflects the parties' inability to break out 
of the historic patterns of labor-management distrust or to 
overcome the fears of changing to a new work system expanding 
individual and collective employee participation. In some 
instances, the parties may not even be aware of — or may not even 
have considered the possibility of — enlarging the scope of 
employee participation. 
For our part, the AFL-CIO has acknowledged that we have "been 
insufficiently attentive to the needs of trade union leaders who 
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are on the firing lines11 and we have committed ourselves to 
"becom[ing] a resource to which unions can turn" and to "help[ing] 
unions identify paths to success so that the labor movement can 
become more and more active in pushing our vision of a new model of 
work organization."11 
In our view, a federal program of best practice awards could 
do a great deal more in helping labor and management learn from 
what others have accomplished and find ways to move forward. The 
prospect of competing for a national award itself would stimulate 
innovative approaches to employee participation. More importantly, 
by spotlighting what the best companies and unions have been able 
to accomplish, others would be encouraged to reexamine their own 
practices and to search for improvements. 
Best practice awards might have the added benefit of 
addressing, at least in a small way, what this Commission has 
recognized as one of the principal impediments to the development 
of democratic forms of participation in non-union companies: the 
dominant management view in this country — as opposed to virtually 
every other industrialized country — that worker organization is 
detrimental to the interest of the firm and that the desire (or 
decision) of workers to organize represents a failure of 
management. Those attitudes lead management to resist organizing 
drives with all their strength, and produce the "highly 
conflictual" (p. 79) and "confrontational process" (p. 75) that 
disserves "the needs of workers, their unions, and their employers" 
(p. 141). 
11




That corporate culture needs to be changed if workers are to 
enjoy an effective right to representation. Just as the Baldridge 
Awards, from all reports, have significantly influenced the way 
management thinks about issues of quality, so, too, best employment 
practice awards have the potential for affecting management 
attitudes towards work organization and worker representation. 
Such awards can showcase companies in which labor and management 
have effectively worked together to achieve high levels of employee 
participation from the workplace to the corporate boardroom, 
teaching by example that labor and management need not be — and 
are not necessarily — antagonists but rather can and do work 
together in mutually beneficial ways. 
III 
In the current climate, no discussion of employee 
participation would be complete without a discussion of Section 
8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act. That section makes it 
unlawful for an employer to "dominate or interfere with the 
formation or administration of any labor organization" which is 
defined (in NLRA section 2(5)) to mean any "organization ... 
committee or plan in which employees participate and which exists 
for the purpose ... of dealing with employers concerning . . . wages, 
rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." Some 
claim that the NLRB's interpretation of that section in the 
Electromation case is inhibiting forms of employee participation 
that ought to be encouraged. As I stated at the outset, we view 
the Electromation controversy as a red herring. We also believe 
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that section 8(a)(2) is integral to the structure of the NLRA and 
should not be weakened in any way. 
1. The Electromation issue is a red herring because 8(a)(2) 
is not inhibiting the diffusion of the forms of employee 
participation extolled by management. The testimony of the 
management representatives who have appeared before this Commission 
makes this clear. For example, Bruce Carswell, Chairman of the 
Board of Directors of the Labor Policy Association, reported that 
"companies are now rapidly moving" to implement employee 
involvement systems; he described this as a "sea change" and a 
"workplace revolution."12 Richard Beaumont, President of 
Organization Resource Counselors, concurred that "dramatic changes 
... revolutionary in character" are "happening at a fairly rapid 
pace."13 John Ong, Chairman of the Business Roundtable, termed 
this the "transformation of the workplace."14 
Their testimony is corroborated by the quantitative evidence 
reviewed by the Commission (at 34-35). Indeed, both the study by 
Paul Osterman and the survey by the Labor Policy Association find 
that approximately two-thirds of the companies with employee 
involvement programs adopted them within the past five years. 
It is also very much to the point that in all of the hearings 
conducted by this Commission and in all of the written submissions 
"id. at 161, 136, 158. 
13Tr. at 93, 98 (Jan. 19, 1994). 
14Tr. at 184 (Dec. 15, 1993). See also Tr. at 86-87 (Nov. 8, 
1993)(Jasinowski testimony about "extraordinary changes that are 
going on in the workplace"). 
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the Commission has received, only one employer — Polaroid — has 
come forward to claim that its conduct in this area has been 
altered by legal constraints. Moreover, both I. MacAlister Booth, 
the President and CEO of Polaroid and Charla Scivally, the employee 
who challenged the Polaroid Employee Committee, made clear in their 
testimony that the only legal complaint that was made against the 
Committee was one filed under the Labor-Management Reporting and 
Disclosure Act, more commonly known as the Landrum-Griffin Act, and 
that complaint went to the absence of an election for the 
leadership of the Committee. 
Nor is it surprising that section 8(a) (2) is not, in practice, 
inhibiting management from widely implementing its version of 
employee involvement. As we have stressed, because of the law's 
procedural and remedial deficiencies this Act does not — indeed 
cannot — do much to inhibit any employer activity. Section 
8(a) (2) is especially unlikely to have much in the way of deterrent 
effect: its enforcement is triggered only by a complaint which, as 
the Commission has recognized (at 54) , occurs rarely and generally 
only when an employer-dominated structure is used as a device to 
defeat a union organizing campaign; and the only risk an employer 
runs is an order to disestablish the unlawfully-created 
entity. 
More fundamentally, 8(a)(2) is by and large an irrelevancy for 
management-controlled involvement systems. Those systems, Richard 
Beaumont explained, do not implicate "representational issues,"15 
15Tr. at 170 (Jan. 19, 1994). 
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and as Daniel Yager, Assistant General Counsel of the Labor Policy 
Association testified they are "not necessarily focused on terms 
and conditions of employment" but rather are "focused on what will 
make the organization more efficient, what their customers want, 
what will make them more competitive."16 Section 8(a)(2), in 
contrast, is as Professor Joel Rogers put it in his testimony 
before this Commission, "centrally concerned about representation. 
It's not concerned about participation."17 
Accordingly, as former NLRB Chairman and present management 
attorney Edward Miller stated to this Commission, "It is indeed 
possible to have effective programs of this kind in both union and 
nonunion companies without the necessity of any changes in current 
law. . . . [A]n employer who really wants to ... can implement a 
very worthwhile employee involvement program and stay within the 
law."18 
2. It is, of course, true that some management-controlled 
forms of participation do address terms and conditions of 
employment, at least insofar as such issues are connected to 
getting the work done more efficiently. It is at this point that 
section 8(a)(2) comes into play. Even here, however, the section 
is not necessarily the dominant player. 
Thus, as presently understood 8(a)(2) does not prevent 
16Id. at 31. 
17Tr. at 171 (Jan. 19, 1994). 
18Statement dated October 8, 1993, submitted to the Commission 
in connection with the East Lansing hearing. 
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employers from delegating to an employee committee or team "the 
power to decide matters [of employment conditions] for itself, 
rather than simply make proposals to management."19 Nor does that 
section prevent employers from discussing these issues with an 
individual employee or with a "brainstorming group" or with an 
employee group convened "for the purpose of sharing information 
with the employer."20 Rather, what the section proscribes is an 
employer "dealing with" its employees on these issues through an 
employer-dominated entity. 
In enacting this prohibition Congress intended, of course, to 
proscribe sham employee organizations — entities created by 
management which employees were forced to join, which held no 
meetings, and which did nothing to represent employees before 
management. Such organizations were quite common in the 193 0's, as 
Daniel Yager describes in his testimony. But contrary to Mr. 
Yager's suggestion, such entities were not the only employer-
dominated entities that existed in 1935 and in no way define the 
limits of the concerns underlying 8(a)(2). 
The reality is, as the Commission has observed (at 47), that 
a variety of "arrangements" — "often called 'employee 
representation plans,' 'works councils,' or 'shop committees,'" — 
predated the Wagner Act and "involved in varying degrees three 
themes: more efficient production and higher quality, workplace 
,9E.I. Dupont, 311 NLRB No. 88, at 3 (1993); see also 
Electromation, 309 NLRB at 995, discussing General Foods Corp.. 231 
NLRB 1232 (1977). 
20E.I.Dupont & Co. , 311 NLRB No. 88, at 2 (May 28, 1993). 
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democratic values and participation, and discouragement of 
'outside' labor organizations." Some of these arrangements had 
"quite respectable, well-founded roots in the advanced management 
thinking of the time," as the labor historian David Brody has 
reminded us.21 
Against this background, the section 2(5) definition of "labor 
organization," which covers "any employee representation committee 
or plan," was crafted expansively for the specific purpose of 
reaching — and thereby in section 8(a)(2) proscribing — all of 
these forms of employee representation.22 To quote Professor Brody 
again, through sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) Congress "left workplace 
representation to collective bargaining";23 by "clearing the field 
of one kind of workplace representation, the law was opening the 
way for the construction of another through the processes of 
collective bargaining."24 
The judgment Congress made to proscribe all forms of employer-
dominated employee organizations that deal with terms and 
conditions of employment and leave employee representation on such 
21Brody, "Section 8(a)(2) and the Origins of the Wagner Act," 
in S.Friedman, R. Hurd, R. Oswald, & R.Seeber (eds), RESTORING THE 
PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW AT 34 (1994) . See also Nelson, 
"Employee Representation in Historical Perspective," in B. Kaufman 
& M. Kleiner (eds), EMPLOYEE REPRESENTATION: ALTERNATIVES AND 
FUTURE DIRECTIONS AT 371-89 (1993). 
22The legislative history leading to the definition of labor 
organization in Ruction 2(5) is reviewed in Electromation, 3 09 NLRB 
at 993; additional detail is added in Brody, supra n. 10, at 39-41. 
Tr. at 126 (Jan. 19, 1994) (testimony of David Brody). 
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matters entirely to collective bargaining rests on two principal 
considerations, each of which remains as valid today as it was in 
1935. 
First, 8(a)(2) embodies the fundamental principle that in 
bilateral relationships, each party should be free to select its 
own representatives and to decide for itself what issues (if any) 
the party wishes to discuss with the other party, what proposals 
(if any) the party wishes to make to the other party, and what 
accommodations (if any) the party wishes to reach with the other 
party. In any other context it would be unthinkable to allow A to 
select B's representative for purposes of dealing with A; the 
employment relationship — in which workers are dependent upon 
their employers for their very livelihood — is the last one in 
which such conflict of interest should be countenanced. 
That is precisely the point Senator Robert Wagner made in 
championing the enactment of 8(a)(2): 
I cannot comprehend how people can rise to the defense of a 
practice so contrary to American principles as one which 
permits the advocates of one party to be paid by the other. 
Collective bargaining becomes a sham when the employer sits on 
both sides of the table or pulls the strings behind the 
spokesman of those with whom he is dealing. ... [T]o argue 
that freedom of organization for the worker must embrace the 
right to select a form of organization that is not free is a 
contradiction in terms.25 
Second, section 8(a)(2) recognizes that allowing employer-
dominated employee organizations even as one form of employee 
representation distorts the process of employee free choice and 
251 Legislative History of the National Labor Relations Act at 
1416-17. 
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thus that such organizations are, in Senator Wagner's words, "one 
of the great obstacles to genuine freedom of self organization."26 
This point warrants brief elaboration. 
Generally speaking, unrepresented employees are unlikely to be 
in a position to evaluate accurately either the long term value of 
employer-dominated labor organizations or the extent and effect of 
employer control. That difficulty, and the added difficulty of 
dislodging an employer-dominated labor organization once 
established, would in the absence of 8(a)(2) lead employers to 
create such organizations at the first sign of need and would pose 
a structural obstacle to employees creating a new, appropriate and 
independent representative at a later time. 
This structural obstacle is of particular importance given the 
overall American labor relations system. As the Commission has 
recognized (at 74-75), in our system employees who desire 
independent representation must go through a "highly 
confrontational" and "conflictual" struggle which creates 
"considerable tension" and exacts high "human cost." Given these 
realities even employees who understand well the limits of an 
employer-controlled organization and who, all things being equal, 
would prefer independent representation may nonetheless resign 
themselves to an employer-controlled organization to pretermit the 
struggle required to establish an independent representative. 
Thus a legal system allowing employers to offer a readily 
available, safe and cost-free employer-dominated representative as 
261 1935 Leg. Hist, at 1373, 1416. 
27 
an alternative to an inaccessible, risky and expensive independent 
representative would not further genuine employee free choice but 
rather create a dynamic that overwhelms it. Indeed, by allowing 
the fallback of an employer-'controlled representative such a system 
would encourage even those employers who recognize the value to the 
enterprise of some form of employee representation to redouble 
their resistance to independent representation. 
Thus, as Professor Brody argued in his testimony before the 
Commission: 
abhorrence of company domination is a corollary to the 
principle of freedom of association central in our labor law. 
We would have to expunge the law itself before we could evade 
the test of company domination in our consideration of 
alternative forms of workplace representation.27 
This is, of course, far more than theory or conviction alone; 
it is a central teaching of history as well as of contemporary 
experience. As the Commission observes (at 47) , employer-dominated 
representation plans grew during and immediately after World War I 
when the National War Labor Board was requiring some form of 
employee representation; few of those plans survived for very long. 
But a second wave of these plans was started in 193 3 by the 
enactment of the National Industrial Recovery Act; for two years — 
until they were banned by section 8(a)(2) — these plans largely 
succeeded in preempting the growth of independent employee 
organizations. 
Santana warns that those who do not learn the lessons of 
history are doomed to repeat it. Contemporary experience in this 
27Tr. at 120 (Jan. 19, 1994). 
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context underscores that warning. We know that American management 
continues to resist independent employee organization with all its 
strength and continues to preach the gospel of a "union-free 
environment." We know, too, that in this crusade American 
management is more than willing to use employer-dominated 
organizations as a tool to subvert independent labor organizations. 
Electromation itself illustrates the point. That case, as 
Professor Charles Morris observed in the statement he submitted to 
the Commission, is a "garden variety Section 8(a)(2) case"28 in 
which the employer, confronting a workforce restive over changes 
unilaterally made by the employer to the employees • terms and 
conditions of employment, sought to diffuse that tension by 
creating ad hoc "Action Committees" to deal with these issues. 
When the employees sought to form a labor union to address their 
concerns, the employer quite explicitly pitted the Action 
Committees against the union, suspending the committees' operation 
during the pendency of the organizing drive and telling the 
employees that the employer "could not continue to work with the 
committees until after the election."29 
The recent decision of an Administrative Law Judge in NCR is 
likewise instructive. In that case, shortly after employees at two 
28
 Statement of Charles Morris, Dec. 1, 193, at 20, Docket No. 
158. In a separate paper that Professor Morris prepared for a 
Symposium and which he submitted to this Commission, he notes that 
"the fame of the case relates more to its hype than to its type — 
for the case was not a bona fide worker participation case." 
Morris, Deja Vu and 8(a)(2) — What's Really Being Chilled by 
Electromation at 2 (April 30, 1994), Docket No. 158. 
29Electromation. 309 NLRB at 992. 
29 
of NCR's locations sought to organize unions, NCR created a system 
of "satisfaction councils" for the stated purpose of providing "a 
means whereby the complaints of the employees could be moved from 
them to management."30 But when a group of NCR employees formed 
their own National Association of NCR Employees and requested a 
meeting between their elected steering committee and NCR's CEO 
Jerre Stead, they were told that, absent an NLRB election, "it 
would not be appropriate for Jerre to meet with, or recognize the 
Committee"; at the same time they were advised that "juice with 
Jerre, the Jerre Line, Ask Jerre, and the Open Door Policy are all 
available for any Associate" and that "the Satisfaction Councils 
are an excellent way to encourage communication between Coaches and 
Associates. "31 
The lesson of cases like these should not be ignored. Edward 
Miller, the management attorney and former NLRB Chairman, states it 
well: "While I represent management, I do not kid myself. If 
Section 8(a)(2) were to be repealed, I have no doubt that in not 
too many months or years sham company unions would again recur."32 
3. In sum, section 8(a)(2) embodies the fundamental principle 
that effective worker representation requires that workers have a 
full measure of independent power and cannot succeed in the absence 
30NCR Corp. , 9-CA-30467, p.4 (May 26, 1994). 
31The facts concerning the National Association of NCR 
Employees were presented to the Commission by Andrew Rivers, an NCR 
employee, at the Commission's East Lansing Hearing (Tr. at 242-49) 
and Mr. Rivers submitted to the Commission the exchange of 
correspondence between his organization and NCR. 
32Statement of Edward Miller, supra, at 7. 
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of such independence. Employers remain free to involve employees 
as much as they wish in the work of the enterprise; section 8(a) (2) 
says only, and quite simply, that employers may not deal with 
employees on their terms of employment through employer-dominated 
entities. That rule remains as valid and vital today as it was 
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Our Five Kev Initiatives 
Our Five Key initiatives are described below so you may understand their 
importance as our organization works to implement them successfuUy. We 
believe that rf we do these five things well, we will achieve our key goals 
and provide Total Customer Satisfaction. The specific identification of each 
initiative sharpens our focus on these exceptionally important issues, all of 
which tie together and reinforce each other. 
1. Six Sigma Quality 
This is our key quality goal to be achieved everywhere in Motorola. 
We will achieve Six Sigma and Beyond results in everything we do, 
and strive for a 10-times reduction in defects every two years. "Six 
Sigma" means approximately 99.9998% perfect product or service. 
This attainable next-level of quality is a major step toward achieving 
100% perfect quality - our ultimate goal. 
2. Totaf Cycle Time Reduction 
We will apply cycle time reduction techniques to alf elements of our 
business, with a goal of 10-times improvement in cycle time in the 
next 5 years. 
3. Product, Manufacturing and Environmental Leadership 
Product and technical leadership have always been a major thrust. 
Manufacturing excellence must become our standard of operation and 
include all support activities necessary to produce the product. 
Environmental leadership is an area in which Motorola leads other 
corporations as we aft strive to save our environment. 
4. Profit Improvement 
This program must be successful in order to achieve the superior 
financial results that will enable us to fund our continued growth. 
Through everyone's efforts to improve profitability, we can secure our 
future by investing in new businesses and technologies. 
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6. Management facihators ensure consistency with Operating Principles. Since 
guidelines cannot anticipate every potential action, management facilitators 
provide guidance and direction, as necessary, to ensure consistency of 
empowered teams to these Operating Principles. Facilitators must seek 
appropriate counsel and interface with subject matter experts - such as 
environment, safety, government procurement, the Personnel Department, 
the Law Department and Corporate Audit - when their teams pursue 
activities in these legally sensitive areas. The team's management facilitator 
is responsible for the team's output as well as being responsible for team 
compliance to the Operating Principles. 
7. Training occurs prior to performing any legally sensitive activity. Teams and 
their respective facilitators must receive approved training before assuming 
responsibility for legally sensitive activities - such as safety, security, 
selection and performance feedback. This will ensure the safety and well-
being of every individual and compliance with applicable legal requirements 
and Motorola policies and procedures. 
As an employee in an empowered environment, we must believe that our 
contribution to the organization ean and will make a difference. We must be 
willing to participate actively in our Job area by continuously striving to improve our 
performance and that of our team. We must be sensitive to our fellow team 
members' roles and our customer needs, acknowledge the efforts and 
contributions of our associates, maintain personal job skills, and be open to skill 
upgrading as required by technology. 
THE "MOTOROLA CULTURE" 
"The Motorola Culture" is an expression to illustrate how we view our corporate 
community where each citizen is entitled to certain fundamental rights and 
privileges. Each citizen of the Motorola community has certain responsibilities as 
well. 
Motorola stands fully behind your right to contribute vour suggestions on trow we 
all might more effectively reach our goats. We welcome opinions, 
recommendations, new ideas and constructive criticisms from everyone through 
open lines of communication. 
Through involvement and providing people with greater responsibility, we maintain 
an environment where each individual feels a personal level of satisfaction in 
reaching a goal. At Motorola, vou are to contribute the futt strength of your skills 
and talent, and to share in the success your contribution brings. 
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SECTION 111 • WHAT YOU CAN EXPECT FROM MOTOROLA 
OUR EMPLOYEE RELATIONS PHILOSOPHY 
With the exception of a recant business acquisition, Motorola has maintained a 
non-union environment fn all our domestic operations throughout more than a 60-
year history. This simply means that the company and its employees are free to 
deal directly with each other, participate* in open and candid dialogue and conduct 
business without the intervention of any third parties. It is Motorola's intent to 
continue this direct relationship with its employees, and we believe that it is also 
the preference of our employees to continue to think, speak and act for 
themselves. 
• Our relationship is built on open and candid dialogue directly between the 
company and employees. Therefore, the need for any third-party 
involvement is eliminated from our business. 
• We treat employees as individuals with dignity and respect. 
• We provide competitive wages and benefits and safe, comfortable working 
conditions. 
• We apply only job-related standards to measure work. 
• We encourage an employee to discuss problems with immediate supervision 
and use the Open Door Policy if the problem cannot be resolved. 
RESOLVING PROBLEMS: OUR OPEN DOOR POLICY 
It is our policy that aU employees be treated with respect. Anyone who has a job-
related problem, question or complaint, or who has bean disciplined or discharged, 
may use the "Open Door Policy* procedures. It is important that you feel free to 
use this procedure; therefore, Motorola will not tolerate any recrimination against 
people who make use of this policy. ' 
Step One: Most job-related problems or concerns can and should be resolved 
directly between you and your immediate supervisor. You are 
encouraged to discuss such issues with your supervisor, who should 
be constructive and objective in working with you to resolve the 
matter. In those cases where the immediate supervisor is the subject 
of the complaint, you are permitted to begin the procedure at Step 2. 
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